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Summary;
This essay presents an overview of the attitudes of leading
nineteenth century economists towards the adoption of an
analogy to natural science as an appropriate model for economics*
This involved a choice between physical science and biological
science as well as a rejection of earlier roots in social
philosophy. The liq>act of Darwinian evolutionary theory in the
last four decades of the century created serious differences
over this question of method.

Nevton vs Darwin in 19th Century Economics *
Analogias undi que indagato
— Jeremy Bentham
by Royall Brandis
aiversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
There &re several approaches to the study of the history of economics
none of vhich do I take to be mutually exclusive, for the shaping of the
ol^cipliae ras been a multi-faceted development. The history of the times,
^^e doTsaadi o.t policy decisions, the previous development of economic
tho. ;,"ia; itjelt, the psychological needs of certain seminal minds—all
cliese are of rmquestioned importance in any search for an understanding
or why economics took a particular turning, followed a particular path
in a giv,.i pti'iod. This paper, however, is focused upon still another
•-.lam'^nt vhich 1 believe to be important—the intellectual environment
Doyond ironoraics itself which surrounded those who wrote on economics,
,
drticui, rly "hose who wrote on economic theory. I do not presume to
explore .lie Zeitgeist in its entirety, but, rather, an area which appears
J !r:e CO Li; of particular importance—the influence of Newtonian and
Oarwir.ian ideas on the development of economics in the nineteenth century.
The niiieteenth century was in many respects the crucial century for
the development of economics. Despite the inclination to date the aodem
version of the discipline from 1776 and the Wealth of Nj|iti<»og , I b«ll«ve
iE^ Tri^tnre of the discipline was fixed in the aiaeteeatk rather th^^ the
tafctghteentk eentury. . . **
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A brief, introductory sketch may be useful here. Three lines of
development converged in the Wealth of Nations ; (1) the practical, policy-
oriented, pragmatic approach of the mercantilists, (2) the moral phi-
losophy approach of Locke and Kume and (3) the abstract, rationalistic,
model-building approach of the Physiocrats. Smith's attack on mercantilism
is well-known, but in his own co^ncern with policy and with the practical,
he is by no means independent of the mercantilist approach even when
arguing most strongly against their policy conclusions. His avowed fun-
damental difference with the mercantilists—that they considered, "produc-
tion, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry
2
and commerce", is, itself, a moral judgment. Smith's less well-known
attack on physiocracy is softened because it had, "never been adopted by
any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men
of great learning and ingenuity in France* It would not, surely, be worth
while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never has
..3
done, and probably never will do any harm in any part of the world."
Yet he does speak of physiocracy as "with all its imperfections. . .perhaps
the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon
4
the subject of political economy" and, consequently, worth the atten-
tion of any student of "the principles of that very important science."
Finally, Smith's own proposal of "the obvious and simple system of natural
liberty" comes straight from John Locke's "Freedom of Men Under Govern-
ment " which is "A Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where the
Rule prescribes not." And this freedom is derived from "The Natural
Liberty of Man" as modified by the necessities of a "well order 'd
Commonwealth.
"
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Th o Natural Science Analogy
The use of naturai science as a model for economics neither began
nor ended with the nineteenth century, but it was in that epoch that it
was most evident in the approach of writers on economics. Indeed, an
analogy to a particular natural science was often explicitly advocated al-
though, as we shall see, there was no agreement on which natural science
was the appropriate one for economists to use.
We need to make clear at the outset that there are several ways in
which an analogy between economics and natural science may be drawn. One
is in the general sense of method. Natural scientists are taken to be
objective in their work. They aim to provide useful generalized descrip-
tions of phenomena. They are unbiased observers whose observations have
no effect on the phenomena observed. Their reports of these observations
are made without any intent other than accuracy and the diffusion of know-
ledge. Personal or political aggrandizement has no place in this process
of observation, report, and generalization. Indeed, the pure scientist is
thought to have no interest in whether his discovery has any meaning for
mankind other than that it adds to man's knowledge of nature. This view
of natural science (whether correct or not) is often held before us as
an ideal which social scientists should st=ek to emulate.
A second sense in which the natural science analogy is intended is
based on the idea of mapping economics onto the structure of a natural
science by finding correspondences between phenomena for each domain.
For example, we may find a one-to-one correspondence between the indi-
vidual consumer in an economic system and the individual particle of
Newtonian physics. Or, again, we may view an economic system or its
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major parts as biological organisms
—
growing, changing, developing in re-
sponse to the interaction id.th the environment, natural or social. These
uses of the analogy to natural science require that one hold the view that
man's economic life is subject to law or laws which are akin to the laws
of nature. And the economist's task becomes one of searching out those
laws.
Perhaps the strongest sense in which the natural science analogy can
be made is to argue that man, himself, is a creature of nature and obeys
its laws
—
physical and biological. Hence, we can understand man's social
relations if we understand the physical and biological laws which govern
him. In this view, social science (including economics) becomes a mere
adjunct of natural science. This view was adopted by Hobbes in the first
flush of the post-Renaissance scientific discoveries: "For what is the
Heart , but a Spring ; and the Nerves but so many Strings ; and the Joynts ,
9
but so many Wheeles ..." and, In turn, the state "is but an Artiflciall
Man ..." Clearly, a problem arises with free will in such a treatment.
Still another way—a compromise way, perhaps,—is to take the view
that man in society (say, man in a market) exhibits behavior in accordance
with statistical laws, given a sufficiently large number of actors, but
is not subject to law in any individual case. There may, of course, be
tendencies or leanings in the individual case, but care is taken that a
sufficient opening is left for free will. In economics, this approach
could be expected to appear reasonably satisfactory when treating of pure
canpetitlon, but would cause trouble when dealing with fewness of actors
—
an obvious interest of economists.
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There are, no doubt, other applications of the natural science
analogy in economics, but the four discussed above would appear to be
the most important historically. Obviously, differenL writers have been
led to adopt different approaches.
The Newtonian Analogy-^—Early Views
We may begin our survey with J, B,. Say's, A Treatise on Political
Economy , first published in 1803. " As opposed to Smith's expression
of his mostly implicit views in the Wealth of i^tions. Say begins his
volume with an explicit statement on method:
"In political economy, as in natural philosophy,
and in every other study, systems have been formed be-
fore facts have been established; the place of the
latter being supplied by purely gratuitous assertions.
More recently, the inductive method of philosophizing,
which, since the time of Baconj has so much contributed
to the advancement of every other science, has been„
applied to the conduct of our researches in this."
And then he calls, morc^ specifically, for:
"a twofold classification of sciencas; namely, those
which may be styled descriptive ^ which arrange and
accurately designate the properties of certain ob-
jects, as botany and natural history; and those which
may be styled experimental , which unfold the reciprocal
action of substances on each other, or in other words,
the connexion between cause and effect, as chemistry
and natural philosophy [_i . e^.
,
physics and astronomy]...
Political economy belongs to the latter; in showing the
manner in which events take place in relation to wealth,
• it forms a part of experimental science.
Say is in no doubt about the similarity between economics and the
exact sciences: "Political economy, in the same manner as the exact
sciences, is composed of a few fundamental principles, and of a great
..14
number of corollaries or conclusions, drawn from these principles."
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At the same time. Say, in a manner which would be echoed in a more
cautious way by Marshall at the end of the century, did net believe mathe-
matical analysis had any usefulness in the discipline: "It would, how-
ever, be idle to imagine that greater precision, or a more steady direction
could be given to this study, by the application of jnathematics to the
solution of its problems." The difficulty, according to Say, lay in
the condition that while sotae of the phenomena studied in economics could
be given numerical values (^.^- , prices) and so fell "within the range of
mathematical inquiry," other aspects of the same phenomena were "not sus-
ceptible of any rigorous appreciation, and cannot, therefore, furnish any
data for absolute calculations."
A further distinction was made by Say between theory—now seen as
the result of empirical scientific investigation—and policy. Economics
"no longer attempts to offer counsel to public author-
ities. Should they, however, be desirous of ascer-
taining the good or evil consequences likely to result
from any favourite project, they may consult this
science, exactly as they would consult hydraulics
upon the construction of a pump or sluice."
Say's is the most forthright early statement of what later would be
known as the positive-nontiative distinction in defining the discipline:
"The belief that moral and political science is founded upon chimerical
theories arises chiefly from our almost continually confounding questions
of right with matters of fact. .
.
Questions of right are always more or
less matters of opinion; matters of fact, on the contrary, are susceptible
of proof and doaonstration. "^
Say leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that he wishes to sever
economics from its connection with social philosophy. His faith in a
Baconian approach to the subject is unwavering:
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"It was but reasonable to expect from the lights of
the age, and from that method of philosophizing which has
so powerfully contributed to the advancement of other
sciences, that 1 might at all times be able to ascend to
the nature of things, and never lay down an abstract
principle that was not immediately applicable in practice;
so that, always compared with well established facts any
one could easily find its confirmation by at the same
time discovering its utility."
This optimism about what could be accomplished in economics by
adopting the correct scientific method was not unique to Say. Indeed,
Robert Torrens had it in even greater measure. Torrens's An Essay on
20
the Production of Wealth is seen by its author as occupying the
methodological middle ground between (in Torrens' s view) Ricardo's
overly deductive Principles and Malthus's overly empirical Essay on Popu-
lation and Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent . As Torrens put
it:
"The science of Political Economy is analogous to
the mixed [_i.e^.
,
applied] mathematics. The data upon
which it proceeds are furnished by observation and ex-
perience; while the conclusions to which it leads, are
attained by a process of ratiocination self-evident in
all its steps."
Furthermore, the present controversies (Torrens appears to be refer-
ring particularly to that between Ricardo and Maithus) in economics were
like those that affected other sciences as they matured. He metitions
specifically the controversy in chemistry that eventuated in the overthrow
of the phlogiston theory. Finally: "With respect to Political Economy
the period of controversy is passing away, and that of unanimity rapidly
approaching. Twenty years hence there will scarcely exist a doubt re-
22
specting any of its fundamental principles."
Five years later, in a new edition of his An Essay on the External
23Corn Trade
, Torrens was even more optimistic: "On a former occasion, the

Author ventured to predict, that, at no distant period, controversy
amongst the professors of political economy would cease, and unanimity
prevail respecting the fundamental principles of the science. He thinks
he can already perceive the unequivocal signs of the approaching ful-
fillment of this prediction." Alas, a century and a half has passed and
Torrens's prediction seems no nearer fulfillment.
There is a striking similarity between the views on method of Malthus
and Say. The first sentence of the former's Principles of Political
25
Economy reads, "It has been said, and perhaps with truth, that the
conclusions of Political Economy partake more of the certainty of the
stricter sciences than those of most of the other branches of human know-
ledge." But this statement is immediately modified to caution
against the belief that where phenomena are dependent upon "so variable
a being as man, and the qualities of so variable a compound as the soil"
we can obtain conclusions as certain as "those which relate to figure
27
and number." Finally, Malthus concludes that "the science of political
economy bears a nearer resemblance to the science of morals and politics
"28
than to that of mathematics.
But it is to Newton as philosopher of science that Malthus appeals
in arguing that both sides of the bullionist controversy had over-simplified
the problem and, thus, both had erred (even though Malthus was inclined
29
to give the Bullionists the better of the argument). In distinguish-
ing between the "law of nature" and "the laws that regulate the movements
of human society," Malthus makes the point that the "effects" of the latter
laws "are continually modified by human interference." The laws themselves

-9-
(not forgetting his earlier caveat ) appear to have a status not unlike
30
that of the laws of nature.
About Ricardo we can have little to say j.n a paper such as this,
and what we do say will be largely inference, for he seems never to have
set out his views on method in any comprehensi.ve way. Yet, there seems
no reason to doubt that the "laws" referred to in his famous statement
that "To determine the laws which regulate this distribution [of rent,
,.31
profit, and wages], is the principal problem jn Political Economy..."
are conceived in a fashion roughly similar to that of Say, Torrens, and
Malthus. Indeed, one might make the argument that Ricardo, who said the
least about method, did the most to fix a particular method upon the
mainstream of economics in the nineteenth cent;ury. Certainly much of
the work in economics that proceeded from "self-evident" axioms through
deductive logic to irrefutable conclusions waj;, consciously or not, fol-
lowing Ricardo' 8 method in the Principles .
Before leaving this (roughly) first quart:er of the century under
study we want to note another concern about the discipline which may have
underlain some of the later reactions to Darwin. Our example is
32
Archbishop Whately's review of Nassau Senior'i; two early works.
Whately has a recurring theme, the need to strike the proper balance
between the requirements of religion and those, of science. In the pro-
cess of his argument, he makes clear his opinions: (1) that economics
is a science and deserves to be treated as such and (2) that there are
moral and religious overtones to the study of economics that cannot be
(safely) ignored. Thus, "if the cultivation of this branch of knowledge
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be left by the advocates of religion, and of social order, in the hands
33
of those who are hostile to both, the result may easily be foreseen.
On the other hand, "The Bible, it should be remembered, was not de-
signed to teach men Astronomy or Geology, or, it may be added. Political
34
Economy, but Religion..." We know, by a prior reference, that Wbateiy's
mention of astronomy stemmed from the Church's rejection of the Copernican
view of the solar system. We can only speculate as to whether his choice
of geology for his second case refers to the early roots of evolutionary
theory to be found in some geological works cf the period (±*^- , Lyell's).
Whately's remarks have another signifIce.nce. When one remembers the
close ties between moral philosophy and religion in that era, Whately can
be seen as acknowledging the independence of economics as a science from
its moral philosophical origins. To put it n.ildly, Whately was premature.
The Newtonian Analogy—Later Views
If we turn to the most influential work between Rlcardo and Marshall
—
35
John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy —we sense a revolt
against treating economics as a branch of Newtonian mechanics (and even
a revolt against the earlier Mill), Mill barkens back to Smith's Wealth
of Nations and vows to expand the topic beyond "abstract speculation.
For practical purposes. Political Economy is inseparably intertwined with
many other branches of social philosophy." A new, comprehensive work
is needed not only because of the advances in economics since 1776, but
also because "the philosophy of society, from which that eminent thinker
[Smith] never separated his more peculiar theme, though still in a very
early stage of its progress, has advanced many steps beyond the point at
37
which he left it."
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Ail of this, however, was just a prelude to Mill's well-known dis-
tinction between the laws of production which man can learn, but not
change, and the laws of distribution which man can change. There is a
further distinction which is not so often noted, but which is important.
The reason the laws of production are immutable is that they are derived
from the laws of nature which man can do nothing about and from "other
38
truths relating to human nature" which are equally immutable. We can
only speculate on what those "other truths" are. (His treatment of labor
in production suggests at one point an almost Hobbesian "matter in motion"
view. )
In the same fashion, there is a frustrating vagueness about the
second part of his dichotomy. The laws of distribution are "partly of
human institution." But "though governments or nations have the power
of deciding what institutions shall exist, they cannot arbitrarily de-
40
termine how those institutions shall work." This last statement
is then explicated by "The conditions on which the power they possess
over the distribution of wealth is dependent, and the manner in which
the distribution is effected by the various modes of conduct which society
may think fit to adopt, are as much a subject for scientific enquiry as
..41
any of the physical laws of nature.
When he turns later in the work to the subject of distribution. Mill,
in his introductory remarks repeats his statement about Production, but
..42
distribution is now "a matter of human institution solely" where it
had been only "partly" so earlier. The rules of distribution are whatever
a society chooses to make them. Mill will consider "not the causes, but
the consequences, of the rules" and these consequences "have as much the
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character of physical laws, as the law of production." There is
little that I can offer in exegesis. I believe Mill was simply trying,
methodologically, to have it both ways. He need not abandon the method
of physical science, but neither need he abandon the social philosophy
he believed best for mankind. Indeed, he may have hoped to gain the
imprimatur of physical science for a distributive scheme embodying jus-
tice in his social philosophy. If so, he would not be the last economist
to seek that chimera.
When, a quarter century later, we reach Jevons and Walras, Mill's
doubts and compromises are gone. It is not much of an overstatement to
say that, for these two, economics J_s^ physics. "In any case, the es-
tablishment sooner or later of economics as an exact science is no longer
in our hands and need not concern us. It is already perfectly clear
that economics, like astronomy and mechanics, is both an empirical and
,.44
a rational science.
Walras' s call for economic theory to become a mathematical theory
is well-known and will not be stressed here. It was, of course, only
one aspect of his broader desire to see an economics modeled on physics.
45
It also seems to have led him to confuse mathematics with science.
Walras, more profound that Jevons in one respect, was careful to
distinguish between natural science and noral science. The former studies
the phenomena resulting from the "blind and ineluctable forces of nature"
while the latter studies the phenomena t'aat "result from the exercise of
46
the human will, a force that is free and cognitive. We might sup-
pose that this distinction would close off the natural science analogy
for Walras, but that is not the case. Far, "any value in exchange, once
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established, partakes of the character of a natural phenomenon, natural
,.47
in its origins, natural in its manifestations and natural in essence.
And this makes possible the "pure theory of economics." Fur theitnore,
"this pure theory of economics is a scieiice which resembles the physico-
. , . . ..48
mathematical sciences m every respect.
By 1896, Walras could be completely explicit on the analogy:
"By demonstrating rigorously first the elementary
theorems of geometry and algebra, and then the result-
ing theorems of the calculus and mechanics j in order to
apply them to experimental data, we have achieved the
marvels of modern industry. Let us follow the same
procedure in economics, and, without doubt, we shall
eventually succeed in having the same control over the
nature of things in the economic and social order as ,„
we already have in the physical and industrial order."
We need not stop long with Jevons. His views were clear and clearly
expressed: "The Theory of Economy thus treated [ i .je
.
, mathematically]
presents s close analogy to the science of Statical Mechanics, and the
Laws of Exchange are found to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a
I'iver as determined by the principle of virtual velocities." And,
"1 know not when we shall have a perfect systam of statistics, but the
want of it is the only insuperable obstacle in the way of making Economics
an exact science." Finally,
"the theory here given may be described as the mechanics
of utility and self-interest. . . Its m.ethod is as sure
and demonstrative as that of kinematics or statics, nay,
almost as self-evident as are the elements of Euclid, .„
when the real meaning of the formulae is fully seized."^
We may speculate on what lay behind this insistance on an analogy
for which the evidence was, to say the least, far from being all in. In
both cases—^Walras and Jevons—there is evident confusion between aathfr
matics and physical science, but the nature of the confutlet it, iti#ff/
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unclear. Did Jevons, for example, believu that economics, because of
the nature of its subject matter, was lik<j physics? His emphasis on
"quantities" suggests this. Or, did he believe that use of mathematical
techniques like those used by Newton and lis successors made economics
into a science like physics? His infatuation with Newton's invention,
the differential calculus, might suggest the latter. With Walras, the
mystery deepens. Why, after making a caraful, and one would think useful,
distinction between "pure natural science' and "pure moral science" did
he then, by a strained logic, convert valae in exchange into a "natural"
phenomenon which he could then argue should be treated in the manner of
a natural science?
We are not helped by the fact that Jsvons held the French economists
in high regard while Walras found little good in them (save Cournot, of
course), except to allow some credit to the Physiocrats, but only in
"social economics" and "applied economics," not in pure, i_.e^. theoretical
53
economics. (In fact, what Walras did find "of enduring value," de-
spite their emphasis on quantitites, were only two conclusions of the
physiocrats— that all taxation should be levied on land-rent and that
laissez-faire was the best policy.)
Were both Jevons and Walras over-stating the case in order to stem
the tide of Darwinism? This seems unlikely. Walras dismisses Darwin in
an off-hand manner in the Elements : "the human race is subject to a
law... that vegetable and animal species tend to perpetuate themselves
by rapid and large increases. The conclusions which Darwin drew from
this fact are debatable, but the fact itself is not." Jevons, seven
years before publication of the Origin of Species
,
had recorded in his

-15-
journal his own belief that, "all animals have been transformed out of one
primitive form by the continued influence. . .of climate, geography, etc."
Consequently, although there is no mention of Darwin in the Principles of
Political Economy , it seems unlikely that Jevons would have agreed with
Walras's evaluation.
What is puzzling is that both men, believing and announcing that they
were setting out to revolutionize economic theory (and not just by mathe-
matizing it) ended in a fundamental sense very much in the methodological
mainstream and with hardly a passing glance at the Darwinian intellectual
revolution that was going on all about them. Two other revolutionaries
of the period—Marx and Veblen—reacted very differently to the winds of
intellectual change.
The Darwinian Analogy
The second major theme of this paper—Darwin's theory of evolution
and, more generally, the biological analogy—has a history strikingly
different from the first theme just described. Evolution was not some-
thing received with the authority of scientific truth at the opening of
the nineteenth century. Rather, evolution was an idea that was "in the
air" and put there as much by social scientists as by biological scien-
57 58
tists. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics appeared eight years
before Darwin's Origin of Species . It was here that Spencer, not for the
first time but more systematically, developed the ideas of social and
human evolution that would permeate what came to be called "Social
Darwinism."
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"Progress," said Spencer, "thereforcy is not an acci-
dent, but a necessitj'. Instead of civilization being
artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with
the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a
flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and
are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the
whole organic creation..."
And, for the economist: "the analogy [after describing the biology
of the human body] between an individual being and a human society, in
which each man, whilst helping to subserve some public want, absorbs a
portion of the circulating stock of commodities brought to his door, is
palpable enough." Finally, "the inferences of political economy are
true, only because they are discoveries by a roundabout process of what
the moral law commands." And "moral truth. . .proves to be a develop-
62
ment of physiological truth."
Even closer to economists was the well-known and well-documented,
attribution to Malthus (Essay on Population ) by Darwin of the seminal
idea (the "struggle for existance") in Darwin's theory of evolution.
The impact of Darwin on economic thought in the last four decades
of the nineteenth century is most strikingly evident in the work of three
men, Karl Marx, William Graham Sumner, and Thorstein Veblen. Each in
his own way can be seen as the voice of a movement—Marxism, Social
Darwinism, and Institutionaiism. Tvv'o of the three are viable intellectual
movements in social thought (including economic thought) today; the third
(Social Darwinism) may well be also, but the name having fallen into
intellectual disrepute, if so it goes by other appellations.
Veblen was certainly an evolutionist, but by no means a pure Darwin-
ian. His speculation on the non-sexual differences between men and women
is as much LaMarckian as Darwiniam. Veblen, we may guess, wanted such
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propositions as the predatory nature of men compared to women to have
the force of a Darwinian product of natural selection, but he was much
too impatient to wait for the necessary amount of time to pass. ' So
he is prepared to let the nature of one's social role speed up the natural
selection process.
Veblen, of course, was far more ambitious for the evolutionary
analogy than such a single example would suggest. His well-known essay
on the subject urged that economists adopt the evolutionary model
because it fit the realities of man's economic life better than any of
the mechanical models which orthodox economists used. Veblen, however,
went beyond this criticism of purely static models to criticize what
might be called dynamic models of the classical and neo-classical schools,
and (what may not be so generally recalled) of the Social Darwinians.
His basis for criticism is, 1 believe, important: He rejected any de-
velopmental model which had a conclusion in some final structure. As
he put it with regard to classical economics; "To meet the high classi-
cal requirement, a sequence—and a developmental process especially-
must be apprehended in terms of a consistent propensity tending to some
ft 7
spiritually legitimate end."
Veblen argued two points. One was that the time-path of human
society did not, necessarily, lead to some end, some "absolute truth"
which was a "spiritual fact." Indeed, there was no reason to suppose
that any particular end, spiritual or not, lay down the evolutionary
path. All the evidence both biological and social pointed to endless
variation. Evolutionary theory of the modern (Darwinian) sort offered
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an explanation of this variation—an explanation that did not require
an end or goal to the process.
The second point of Veblen's argument wa-s -a ^orrolary of the argu-
ment just made. The classical economists' insistence on the "normal" or
the "natural" (that is, an equilibrium) as what their economic laws were
directed to was a result of their imputing "to things a tendency to work
out what the instructed common sense of the time accepts as the adequate
or worthy end of human effort."
To Veblen ( in a passage that indicates his awareness of the influence
of a physical science model on this classical approach):
"By this method the theory of an institution or
a phase of life may be stated in conventionalised
terms of the apparatus whereby life is carried on,
the apparatus being invested with a tendency to an
equilibrium at the normal, and the theory being a
formulation of the conditions under which this
putative equilibrium supervenes. In this way we
have come into the usufruct of a cost-of-production
theory of value which is pungently reminiscent of
the time when Nature abhorred a vacuum."
Finally,
"The evolutionary point of view, therefore,
leaves no place for a formulation of natural laws
in terms of definitive normality, whether in
economics or in any other branch of inquiry.
Neither does it leave room for that other ques-
tion of normality. What should be the end of the
developmental process under discussion?"
It comes as no surprise that Marx, as an intellectual descendant of
Hegel, found evolutionary theory more satisfactory than mechanistic models
in picturing the world. Fifteen years before the Origin of Species , Marx
was writing, "The object of labor, is, therefore the objectification of
man's species life." And this discussion of man as species leads
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72directly into Marx's treatment of alienation. This way of thinking
about man's essence as his species characteristics prepares the way for
Marx to endorse the view that his Capital is evolutionary theory applied
to economic life.
As early as the preface to the first German edition of Capital (1867),
Marx is saying that from his standpoint, "the evolution of the econcsnic
73
*
formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history..."
This coincides remarkably with the belief expressed twenty-three years
74
earlier that social science was properly a part of natural history.
And the two specific references to Darwin in the first volume of Capital
are clearly intended to strengthen Marx's argument by appeal to Darwinian
analogy.
But Marx's own ideas on all this seem best revealed by the quotation
from a Russian review of Capital which he used in the Afterword to the
second German edition (1873) of the book in order to make clear his own
view on method.
"'in his [Marx's] opinion every historical period has
laws of its own... In a word, economic life offers us
a phenomena analogous to the history of evolution in
other branches of biology. The old economists mis-
understood the nature of economic laws when they
likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry.
A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that
social organisms differ among themselves as funda-
mentally as plants or animals. . .The scientific value
of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the
special laws that regulate the origin, existance,
development, death of a given social organism and
its replacement by another and higher one. And it
is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book
has. '
"
To this, Marx added, "...what else is he picturing but the dialectic
method?" And by the end of the century, Enrico Ferri is writing a book
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to demonstrate, "...that Marxian Socialism. . .is only the practical and
fruitful fulfilmentj in the social life, of that modern scientific revo-
lution which. ..has triumphed in our times, thanks to the works of Charles
.,77
Dand.n and Herbert Spencer.
The root of Marx's relationship with Darwinian thought lies at a
deeper level than that already treated. It lies in Marx's organic view
of society, in, that is, a biological analogy of which evolution is only
one aspect. The very notion of "class" is of an organism that is dif-
ferent from, and more than, the individual units that comprise its parts.
As Marx said in his first preface,
"...the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of
study than are the cells of that body... But in
bourgeois society the commodity-form of the product
of labor—or the value-form of the commodity—is
the economic cell-forms. To the superficial ob-
server, the analysis of these forms seems to turn
upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae,
but they are of the same^order as those dealt with
in microscopic anatomy."
I will say little about Social Darwinism, for that is a topic that
has been many times studied and restudied. Once one has quoted Sumner,
("the law of the survival of the fittest was not made by man and cannot
be abrogated by man. We can only, by interfering with it, produce the
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survival of the unf itrtest. " ), there is very little more to say. What
is, perhaps, worth noting is that this use of the Darwinian analogy served
to support and justify the status quo of social and economic arrange-
ments while the two revolutionaries in economic thought of the period
—
Marx and Veblen—were drawing very different inferences from the same
analogy.
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The DuaJism of Marshall
And so we come to Marshall, in this connection (as in so many other
aspects of nineteenth century economics) a dualist. In the middle of the
1870's he is writing with obvious agreement, "Mill has brought out the
fact that there is a close analogy between the methods of economic science,
and those of the science of mechanics."
At the same time, he was writing,
"...there are many .. .classes of movement in the physical
world, which are exact copies of movements that have
gone before. But every movement that takes place in
the moral world alters the magnitude if not the character
of the forces that govern succeeding movements. And
economic forces belong to the moral world in so far as
they depend upon human habits and affections, upon man's
knowledge and industrial skill."
Even the cryptic motto of the Principles—unchanged through eight
editions, "Natura non facit saltum " can be interpreted, not only as Whitaker
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does, to be Darwinian, but also as a bow to Newton, the inventor of
the differential calculus. The latter interpretation is encouraged by
Q O
W. R. Scott's obituary on Marshall in which he attributes the source
of the idea of the motto for Marshall to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
which is Newtonian through and through.
When we reach the Principles itself, we find the same dualism. When
Marshall speaks of method he sounds very much like an evolutionist:
"The notion of continuity with regard to development
is common to all modern schools of economic thought,
whether the chief influences acting on them are those
of biology, as represented by Herbert Spencer; or of
history and philosophy, as represented by Hegel's
Philosophy of History , and by more recent ethico-
historical studies on the Continent and elsewhere.
These two kinds of influences have affected, more
than any other, the substance of the views expressed
in the present book..."
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Yet, only one chapter, the first (and shortest) of the five
chapters devoted to "Industrial Organization," is Darir/inian throughout.
By the eighth edition, thirty years later, Marshall is fully aware
of the contradiction, but is still trying to have it both ways:
"The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology
rather than in economic dynamics. But biological
conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics;
a volume on Foundations must therefore give a rela-
tively large place to mechanical analogies: and fre-
quent use is made of the term 'equilibrium,' which
suggests something of statical analogy."
Since there can be little doubt that Marshall thought the biological
analogy and the Darwinian point of view the appropriate model for eco-
nomics, how did he come to produce a work (and keep it in print through
eight editions over thirty years) that, by his own, somewhat belated ad-
mission, did not follow that method? 1 would like to suggest three pos-
sible contributors to Marshall's ambivalence: (1) Marshall's well-known
desire not to n^ke a clean break with the classical tradition would seem
to imply that the analogy to Newtonian mechanics could not really be dis-
carded since it had received the imprimatur of John Stuart Mill;
(2) Darwinism, however well defended by some (but not all) of England's
leading intellectuals, was still not quite respectable in the Victorian
Age. And a man who, when a thirty-three year old bachelor, would write
home to his mother that "there is scarcely a virtuous woman in the state
of Nevada" is not likely to push too hard on the limits of respectability;
(3) Whether, indeed, economics was any kind of a science was not all that
settled in Marshall's formative professional years.
This third matter came to a head in 1877 when a group including no
less a personage than Francis Galton led a move to drop Section F
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(Statlstics and Economics) froni the British Association for the Advance-
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ment of Science, Sir Rawson Rawson reported to the Royal Statistical
Society that, "Mr. Sclater, and one or two others, took the opportunity
of suggesting that Economic Science vas not so pure and exact as some of
the other sciences, and that as there: was a Social Science Congress it
was not necessary that statistics anc. economics should be represented at
89
the British Association." Later, (ialton wrote a communication to the
Society in which he listed the titles; of nearly one hundred papers read
in Section F at recent British A.A.S., meetings. He found only a handful
suitable for a scientific association. (Jevons's paper on the relation of
sunspots to the price of corn was the only strictly economics paper on
Galton's approved list.) Galton concluded that, "It would appear that
the subjects commonly brought before Section F cannot be considered
, ..^r. ..90scientific.
Given Marshal 1 's personality, his desire to be the leader of British
economics, and his belief in continuity with the past, it is only to be
expected that he would not make the kind of whole-hearted commitment to
the Darwinian analogy that some of his remarks may indicate he contem-
plated making. He was no Marx or Veblen.
Thus, for economics, the ninetecmth century closed on an ambiguous
note regarding the methodological paiih that would predominate in the
twentieth century. And the question of whether any natural science
analogy was appropriate was lost sight of in the disagreement over which
91
natural science analogy was to be fo. lowed.
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Notes
*This paper is a fragment of a more ambitious work-in-progress. Con-
sequently, two draconian constraints have been set for this particular
paper: (1) Full-length volumes on the methodology of economics published
during the period are not discussed. Thus, there is no mention of impor-
tant works such as those of Cairnes, Senior, or J. N. Keynes; (2) modern
studies relating to the same period and subject are not referred to or
critically discussed. For the most recent example, my discussion here of
Marx makes no reference to the article by Enrique UreSa in History of
Political Economy (Winter 1977), an article which takes a different view
of the relation of Marx to Darwin and goes into the matter in much greater
detail than I could hope to do in what is, essentially, a survey article.
One other introductory remark may be useful. I take "Newton" to
represent the point of view that in the methods especiall}', but to some
extent in the substance, of physical science lay the path to truth in
economics. "Darwin," on the other hand, represents the point of view
that it was in biological science, and especially in the idea of evolu-
tion, that the appropriate guide to economix truth was to be found.
This is not exact because inevitably in a discussion of the nineteenth
century, Darwin the man will intrude, while by that same period, the
Newtonians of physical science had gone beyond Newton (or, perhaps,
retrogressed in subtle ways) so that we cannot be certain Newton would
have been a good nineteenth century Newtonian^ But the Newtonians thought
they were being true to Newton's teaching which is really all we need to
justify using his name in the title.
Sir James Steuart sumised up well the seldom explicit dislike of
the mercantilist mind for abstract model-building: "when inquiries are
made concerning the complicated interests of society, the vivacity of
an author's genius is apt to prevent him from attending to the variety
of circumstances which render uncertain every consequence, almost, which
he can draw from his reasoning. To this I ascribe the habit of running
into what the French call Syst^.mes . . Such systems are mere conceits;
they mislead the understanding, and efface the path to truth," An
Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economv, [1767], Edinburgh,
1966, p. 8.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, [1776], New York, 1937, p. 625.
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This paper was presented at t'ne History of Economics Society
meetings, May 1978. I can, here, only acknowledge with thanks and mention
briefly the couiments of the two discussants on that occasion: Professor
Abraham Hirsch of the City University of New York and Professor Donald A.
Walker of Indiana University (Pennsylvania). Professor Hirsch pointed
out that confusion of mathematics \dLth physical science was more wide-
spread in economics than suggested by my reference to it with regard to
Jevons and Wairas. Both he and Professor Walker felt that the "war"
between Newtonians and Darwinians in nineteenth century economics
never was more than a skirmish which the Darwinians lost. However,
even if one accepted this proposition, the fact that both Marx and
Veblen need to be counted among the Darwinians should make us suspect
that the influence of the battle on economics cannot be ignored.
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